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NOTE
LEGAL ETHICS-REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERING
INTERESTS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE: APPEARANCES OF
IMPROPRIETY AND UNAVOIDABLE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST?
INTRODUCTION
One of the most noticeable changes in law schools in recent
years has been the increase in the number of women enrolled.' In
the beginning of the 1963 academic year, 1,883 women were en-
rolled in law schools approved by the American Bar Association, 2
constituting 3.8 percent of the total enrollment. In the fall of 1968,
there were 3,704 women enrolled,3 or 5.9 percent. By the 1973-74
school year, the number of women had grown to 16,760,1 15.8
percent.
One effect of the increased number of women in law schools
is that more and more lawyers are married to other lawyers.
Where lawyer-spouses are not associated in the practice of law,
questions have arisen about the propriety of a lawyer's accepting
employment on behalf of a client whose interests differ from those
of a client represented by the lawyer's spouse or by that spouse's
firm. These questions have been considered in ethics opinions
issued by the bar associations of four states: Arizona,5 Colorado,'
Illinois,7 and Virginia.' The Arizona and Illinois opinions are lim-




ARIZONA ETHIcs COMM., OPINION No. 73-6 (Reconsideration of OPINION No. 71-27)
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6].
, Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 52, 3 COLO. LAWYER, Apr. 1974,
at 55 [hereinafter cited as COLORADO OPINION No. 52]. Opinion 52 was adopted on Febru-
ary 9, 1974. Since its adoption, the ethics committee has voted to reconsider the opinion's
holdings, but until a new opinion is issued the present one is considered in effect.
ILLINOIS STATE BAR Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL ETmcs OPINION No. 311 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311].
1 Letter from R. J. Lilliard, Chairman, Legal Ethics Committee, The Virginia State
Bar, to a Grafton, Virginia, lawyer, Nov. 12, 1974, on file with Professor Cathy S. Krendl,
University of Denver College of Law [hereinafter cited as Virginia opinion].
In addition to the ethics opinions on this subject, the Nevada Supreme Court rules
forbid representation of conflicting interests by attorneys related in a number of different
ways, including "consanguinity within the third degree." NEV. SuP. CT. R. 170. Although
"consanguinity" does not include the marriage relationship, it is probable that any restric-
tion of representation of conflicting interests by spouses in Nevada would be achieved by
amendment of this court rule, and not by an ethics opinion.
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ited to fact situations involving criminal cases; they hold that it
is improper for one spouse to seek to represent a defendant prose-
cuted by the other spouse or by another member of the public
office which employs the spouse.'
The Virginia opinion was in response to an inquiry concern-
ing the propriety of a lawyer's representing one party to a divorce
action when the other party is represented by the firm which
employs the lawyer's spouse.'0 Because of wide interest in the
subject, however, the Virginia Legal Ethics Committee, in addi-
tion to addressing the question posed, discussed additional situa-
tions, both those involving direct representation by lawyer-spouse
against lawyer-spouse and those involving representation of op-
posing interests by the spouses' firms." The committee concluded
that representation in which one spouse is actively involved
against the other spouse or the other spouse's firm is not ethically
permissible." So long as neither spouse is directly involved, ac-
cording to the committee, representation of opposing clients by
the two firms is permissible.'
3
Colorado's opinion is similar to that adopted in Virginia,
except that it includes consideration of the propriety of a lawyer's
representation of a defendant in a criminal case prosecuted by a
district attorney's office which employs that lawyer's spouse."
The opinion's conclusion coincides with that of the Virginia Legal
Ethics Committee: It is not proper for a lawyer to accept employ-
ment by a client whose interests differ from those of a client of
the lawyer's spouse or a member of the spouse's firm; 5 it is proper
for the firms to represent clients with differing interests so long
as neither spouse participates in the representation."
One result of the ethical questions raised by the representa-
tion of the opposing sides of pending legal matters by spouses
might be a reluctance on the part of law firms to hire any appli-
cant for a job if the applicant's spouse is employed by, or seeking
law-related employment with, another law firm in the same com-
ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 1; ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311 at 1.




COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55.
is Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
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munity. That such a reaction by employers is a reality is indi-
cated by a rule adopted by the Committee on Placement at Har-
vard Law School stating that employers who use the school's
placement office for interviews may not refuse to hire an appli-
cant merely because the applicant's spouse is or will be a lawyer
in the same town.'7
The Committee concluded... that the likelihood of unprofes-
sional conduct . .. is insufficient in these situations to justify the
substantial hardship worked on married couples by a policy of refus-
ing to hire a lawyer whose spouse works for another firm in town.' 8
Where a law firm's recruiting policy is supported by an ethics
committee opinion, married couples face a greater likelihood that
one or both of them will have difficulty finding employment in
the same community. 9 For instance, if one spouse obtains a posi-
tion with a state or local prosecuting office, the other may find it
impossible to work in criminal defense matters, at least in that
jurisdiction. Or, if both spouses are interested in, for example,
commercial law, and seek employment with firms specializing in
that area, they may face great unwillingness on the part of such
firms to risk the possibility of creating a conflict of interest be-
tween themselves and other firms which they frequently encoun-
ter in litigation. The married lawyers may find that they must
choose to work in greatly dissimilar fields of law, or to live where
each may work in a different city, or to enter practice in the same
firm, their own or an established one without a policy against
hiring close relatives. "Substantial hardship" seems an apt de-
scription of such results.
Even if the lawyer-spouses are able to find employment with
different law firms, ethics opinions like those described pre-
viously may present clients of their firms with difficult circum-
stances. For instance, if a lawyer represents a bank in making a
construction loan to a client represented by the lawyer's spouse,
may granting of the loan be made contingent upon the borrower's
obtaining different counsel in order to avoid possible charges of
conflict of interests? If the borrower does retain a different law-
yer solely to complete the loan transaction, how may the new
,1 Memorandum from Ass't. Dean Russell A. Simpson, Law School of Harvard Uni-
versity, to Interviewers Regarding Placement Office Rule 5, September 30, 1974, on file
at Harvard [hereinafter cited as Simpson Memorandum].
1 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 125-26, infra.
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lawyer comply with the lender's request for a statement by the
borrower's general counsel (presumably the first firm) that the
transaction will not be jeopardized by any of the other business
dealings of the borrower?
In addition to the impact of these opinions on lawyers and
clients, adoption and enforcement of such opinions at this time
may subject bar associations to criticism because the effect of the
opinions may be harsher on women's prospects for employment
than men's. Such criticism might note that, in general, wives
complete their career education after their husbands."0 Thus, gen-
erally the husbands are employed as lawyers before an actual
conflict arises, and it is the wives who must face the restrictions
on hiring which stem from the marriage relationship. The Arizona
Ethics Committee took note of this pattern in Arizona Opinion
73-6, a reconsideration of an earlier, more restrictive opinion.',
The committee reconsidered the first opinion at the request of the
Board of Governors of the Arizona Bar Association, and the re-
quest was prompted, at least in part, by recognition that "the
restrictive position therein taken may adversely affect the em-
ployment opportunities of women lawyers who are increasing in
number and who have never had an easy time of it in our profes-
sion.'"'
The harshness of the opinions considered here on married
lawyers is accentuated by the fact that few similar restrictions are
placed on lawyers related to each other in different ways (for
" See THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN
IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973). This study of American graduate and professional students
found a marked difference in the age distribution of men and women; in particular, about
one-fourth of the women students were married, divorced, or separated and 35 or older.
Id. at 83-4. Data in the study indicated that more than one-half of the married women
graduate students, as opposed to only one-fourth of the married men, had spouses attend-
ing graduate school or who had attained a graduate degree, suggesting "that women who
are married to graduate students or to men who have attained a graduate degree are
especially likely to seek graduate education." Id. at 85. In the case of medical students,
the Commission reported that more than one-half of women who obtain M.D. degrees are
married to physicians. Id. at 24, citing Powers, Parmelle, & Wiesenfelder, Practice Pat-
terns of Women and Men Physicians, 44 J. MED. ED. 481, 482 (1969). Although no similar
study could be found involving women law students, it seems reasonable to assume that
a significant number of women now receiving the J.D. degree are married to lawyers.
11 ARIZONA ETmics COMMrrTEE, OPINION No. 71-27 (1971). This opinion concluded that,
where a husband was regularly employed and engaged in prosecuting criminal cases, his
wife could not accept and defend cases prosecuted by the husband or any other member
of his office, and neither could any other member of the wife's firm.
"ARZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 4.
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example, parent-child), or on their firms.23 Certainly, one must
not minimize the importance of avoiding the harm to the profes-
sion and the public which could result from representation of
opposing clients by lawyers married to each other. However, in
view of the consequences described above, it is necessary to scru-
tinize carefully ethics opinions in this area to determine if their
objectives of giving valid guidance to lawyers in such situations
may be achieved without such a harsh impact.
Because the Colorado and Virginia ethics committees have
considered inter-spousal conflicts most broadly, this analysis will
primarily focus on these two opinions. Consideration will be given
to whether the opinions offer a consistent and logical application
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,24 and whether they
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. Finally, alternative approaches will be suggested
for dealing with possible conflicts of interests between lawyer-
spouses, approaches more in harmony with the Code and with the
Constitution.
I. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Colorado's Opinion 52 is based on three hypothetical fact
situations involving Lawyer A and Lawyer B, husband and wife
not associated in the practice of law.25 In the first situation, Law-
yer A seeks to represent a client whose interests differ from those
23 See, 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR AsSOCIATION ETHics OPINIONS (1970), under index
heading "Conflict of interests, relatives." E.g., where son is a substitute justice in civil
and police courts, whether his father-partner may practice in those courts is a local
problem which must be considered on the merits of each case. Id. 4440 (The Virginia
State Bar). Many opinions have held it proper for a father to defend in a criminal case
prosecuted by his son. E.g., id. 1047 (Kansas Bar Ass'n); 1434 (The Missouri Bar);
3103, 3171, 3332 (North Carolina State Bar).
After Opinion 73-6 was issued, the Arizona ethics committee considered the case of
an attorney whose father-in-law was a member of a zoning board which passed a regula-
tion being challenged by a client of the son-in-law's firm. The committee ruled that so
long as the relationship between the lawyer and the board member was disclosed to the
client and the client consented it was proper for the firm to accept the employment.
ARIZONA ETHics CoMM., OPINION No. 73-19 (1973).
The main thrust of this particular point is the integrity and the honesty
of the lawyer involved, to himself and to his client. So long as there is
complete disclosure and acceptance by the client, there is no harm done.
Id. at 4.
24 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
COLORADO OPINON No. 52 at 55.
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of a client represented by Lawyer B.1 In the second situation,
Lawyer A seeks to defend a client prosecuted by a district attor-
ney's office which employs Lawyer B. 7 In the third, Lawyer C, a
member of Lawyer A's firm, seeks to represent a client with inter-
ests different from those of a client represented by Lawyer D, a
member of Lawyer B's firm.28
The Virginia ethics opinion also considers three hypothetical
situations: 1) Lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse, each actively
involved in the same case; 2) lawyer-spouse actively participating
in a case against lawyer-spouse's firm; 3) lawyer-spouse's firm
against lawyer-spouse's firm, neither spouse directly involved.'
The second and third situations are applications of the principle
of "vicarious disqualification, ' ' 30 a concept also considered in
Opinion 52's third fact situation.3' Although the Virginia opinion
does not specifically discuss the question of representation in a
criminal case, as does the Colorado opinion, 32 that question is
really only a more specialized version of the spouse-against-
spouse and spouse- against-spouse's-firm questions decided by
the Virginia committee.33
In analyzing the two opinions, this section will discuss the
committees' treatment of the direct confrontation of lawyer-
spouse against lawyer-spouse, and the extension of the principles
developed therein to representation by one spouse's firm against
the other spouse's firm. Finally, additional problems which arise
when one spouse is employed by a public prosecutor's office will
be analyzed with reference to the opinions from Arizona and Illi-
nois.
A. Lawyer-spouse Against Lawyer-spouse
In considering whether there is a conflict of interest when
husband and wife represent clients with differing interests, the
Id. In the Code of Professional Responsibility the phrase "differing interests" is
defined as including any interest that will have an adverse effect on the judgment or
loyalty of a lawyer to a client, "whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest." ABA CODE, Definitions.
" COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55.
2a Id.
Virginia opinion at 2.
" See ABA CODE Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter DR] 5-101, and authorities cited
therein, n. 29; DR 5-105(D).
"1 COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55, 57.
32 Id. at 55, 56.
Virginia opinion at 2.
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Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Committee looks at what it
considers "the realities of the marital relationship and the possi-
bility at least that the domestic and professional responsibilities
of lawyers A and B may be on a collision course when they repre-
sent conflicting interests. 34 Given the possibility of such a con-
flict, the committee finds the situation covered by the following
provision of the Code:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judg-
ment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected
by his own financial, business, property or personal interests. 3
In spite of the provision for consent in DR 5-101(A), the
ethics committee decides that consent may not be given to the
representation of conflicting interests by husband and wife be-
cause it "gives rise to such an appearance of impropriety . . .
that such representation should be scrupulously avoided. ' 3 To
support its position that consent is not available to allow employ-
ment of lawyers in matters which may conflict with their personal
interests, the committee quotes the following statements from
Drinker's treatise on legal ethics:
The Canon does not sanction representation of conflicting inter-
ests where such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such
cases. The American Bar Association has acquiesced in numerous
decisions of its Ethics Committee construing the exception as not
exclusive and consent is unavailable where the public interest is
involved. There are, also, certain cases in which such representation
is improper or at least unwise even with consent. 7
It is worth noting, however, that the Drinker statement cited
comes from a discussion of the consent exception to Canon 6 of
the old Canons of Professional Ethics,"8 which differs significantly
from the comparable sections of the Code. 9 Canon 6 began with
a requirement that, before accepting employment, a lawyer dis-
close any interests or relationships he has to the parties or subject
matter of the employment. It then continued, "It is unprofes-
sional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55.
ABA CODE DR 5-101(A) (footnote omitted).
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 56.
Id., quoting H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 120 (1953).
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETncs No. 6 [hereinafter cited as CANON 6].
n ABA CODE DR 5-101; DR 5-105.
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of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."4 Thus,
the Drinker excerpt which appears in Opinion 52 refers to repre-
sentation of opposing interests by one lawyer, the situation con-
sidered in present disciplinary rule 5-105.1' This excerpt does not
refer to the consent exception to representation of an interest
which conflicts with the lawyer's personal interests, now covered
in disciplinary rule 5-101(A).4 Furthermore, immediately follow-
ing the excerpt cited in Opinion 52, the Drinker text continues:
There are, however, not infrequently cases in which it is highly
desirable and to the advantage of everyone concerned that the same
lawyer should, at the desire of both parties, represent them both. 3
Professor Drinker continues:
In order that mutual consent be effective, full disclosure must,
of course, be made and the effect of the dual relationship fully ex-
plained to both parties. Also, all parties concerned must consent, a
majority not being enough."
There are, of course, situations in which a lawyer's personal
interests would conflict so strongly with those of his client that
representation would be improper even with the client's consent.45
However, in Opinion 52 the ethics committee decides that con-
sent can be made unavailable to allow direct representation of
opposing clients by lawyer-spouses simply because of appear-
ances of impropriety which might result. To support this limita-
tion of consent, the committee refers to the Code requirement
that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of profes-
CANON 6.
ABA CODE DR 5-105(C).
12 Id., DR 5-101(A).
3 DRINKER, supra note 37, citing Strong v. International B.L. & I. Union, 82 Ill. App.
426, 431 (1898); Eisemann v. Hazard, 218 N.Y. 155, 159, 112 N.E. 722, 723 (1916); Taylor
v. Vail, 80 Vt. 152, 161, 66 A. 820, 823 (1907).
" DRINKER, supra note 37, at 121 (footnotes omitted).
4S Charles R. Frederickson, Chairman of the Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Com-
mittee, has stated that the committee assumed consent by the parties in the following
hypothetical situation when considering the spouse-against-spouse fact pattern: A is law-
yer for an insurance company, paid a regular salary. A's spouse, B, represents the plaintiff
in a $500,000 damage suit against the company A represents. B is paid on a contingent
fee basis. Address by Charles R. Frederickson to a Denver Bar Association topical lunch-
eon, in Denver, Dec. 11, 1974. Certainly, consent to such representation, if it could be
demonstrated, would not suffice to make the representation acceptable under the Code.
However, a finding that such a conflict was improper would not be based only on appeals
to appearances of impropriety, but on the facts, which reveal the kind of conflict with
personal financial interests which would be unacceptable whether the lawyers involved
are husband and wife, parent and child, or related in other ways.
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sional impropriety."4 Specifically quoted is the following ethical
consideration:
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irre-
sponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical
conduct of a lawyer may appear to a layman to be unethical ...
When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should deter-
mine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confid-
ence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal
profession. 7
The ellipses in the material quoted in Opinion 52 mark the omis-
sion of several sentences which significantly change the impact
of Ethical Consideration 9-2:
In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confi-
dence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of ma-
terial developments in the matters being handled for the client.
While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that
has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or
in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should
never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obli-
gation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject him or the
legal profession to criticism."
Thus, the cited Code provision in fact applies to the "champion
of an unpopular cause," and not to lawyers whose professional
actions are misinterpreted by some members of the lay public,
even though the lawyers are acting in accord with the "explicit
ethical guidance" available in the Code for dealing with questions
of conflict of interests.49
While the Colorado opinion relies on a finding of appearances
of impropriety, even where no actual conflict may exist,5" the
Virginia opinion is based on a finding of actual conflict. The
Virginia committee states that it is "most reluctant to conclude
, ABA CODE Canon 9.
,7 Id. Ethical Consideration [hereinafter EC] 9-2, cited in COLORADO OPINION No. 52
at 56.
,ABA CODE EC 9-2.
" See, e.g., ABA CODE DR 5-101; DR 5-105; EC 5-1 to 5-3; EC 5-14 to 5-17; EC 5-19;
EC 5-21; EC 5-22.
This is not to impute improper intentions to any lawyer, nor to ignore
the fact that in many marriage situations no actual conflict would exist.
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55 (emphasis added).
We are of the opinion that Fact Situation 1 gives rise to such an appear-
ance of impropriety, even though such impropriety may not in fact exist, that
such representation should be scrupulously avoided.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
1975
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that under no circumstances would [such representation] be
proper."'" Examples of situations that might be proper, according
to the committee, are representation in a completely uncontested
matter after full disclosure and consent, and representation by
married lawyers who are in fact legally separated. The committee
continues, however:
Even these situations give rise to problems but the Committee is not
prepared to say that such representation is improper per se....
[Tihe Committee feels that these instances would be so isolated
that it should be enunciated as a general rule that representation
under these circumstances is in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
In support of this rule, the committee cites the following
Code provisions: 1) Every client's right to his lawyer's totally
independent judgment and undivided loyalty;5 3 2) a lawyer's duty
to guard zealously against any personal interest or involvement
which might impair dedication to his client's cause;14 and 3) the
client's right to feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his
lawyer without any question of the lawyer's integrity in keeping
the client's confidences inviolate. 5 "To allow a husband and wife
to advocate opposing positions in the same controversy. . . tends
to compromise these well-established principles of professional
ethics.""
The committee also notes that the public considers the mar-
ital relationship uniquely close, and states that allowing repre-
sentation of differing interests by lawyer-spouses would be to
approve an appearance of impropriety "in derogation of Canon
9."57 Clearly the Virginia committee finds the likelihood of actual
impropriety in representation of opposing clients by lawyer-
spouses much greater than does the Colorado committee.
Furthermore, reliance by both committees on the need to
avoid appearances of impropriety may be contrary to some recent
court decisions in which the concept has been considered. In
Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver District Court" former
1' Virginia opinion at 1.
52 Id.
11 ABA CODE EC 5-1.
51 Id. EC 5-2.
Id. EC 4-1.
Virginia opinion at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
177 Colo. 210, 493 P.2d 374 (1972).
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members of the public defender's office sought to represent cer-
tain defendants on a private basis at the request of their clients.
The Denver District Court found the representation improper
because of appearances that the lawyers had engaged in solicita-
tion of clients or that they had previously mis-stated the defen-
dants' indigency in order to qualify them for representation by
public defenders. This decision was reversed by the Colorado
Supreme Court, which found those appearances insufficient to
justify interference with the defendants' right to the counsel of
their choice. According to the court the proper remedy was not
to disqualify the lawyers from the case, but to bring disciplinary
proceedings against the lawyers based on evidence of actual, not
apparent, violations of the Code.59
An even stronger statement against an overboard application
of the concept of appearance of impropriety is found in the case
of Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corporation,"0 in which the defendants moved to disqualify the
plaintiff's lawyers because one partner in that firm had pre-
viously worked as an associate in the law firm representing the
defendants. The defendants argued that the standard for vicari-
ous disqualification should be set broadly, encompassing partici-
pation in suits against any interest ever represented by a previous
firm by all partners and associates of that firm in order to avoid
even the slightest appearance of impropriety.' In rejecting this
contention, the court stated that such important considerations
as the right of clients to counsel of their choice and the need to
avoid restricting the careers of young lawyers required that dis-
qualification be based on proof of actual work in specific cases by
the former lawyer from which it would be reasonable to infer that
he had gained information of value to his present client. "The
danger of damage to public confidence in the legal profession
would be great if we were to allow unfounded charges of impro-
priety to form the sole basis for an unjust disqualification.""2
Colorado bases its disqualification of lawyers from cases in
opposition to their spouses on grounds of avoiding appearances of
impropriety, while observing that actual impropriety may not
" Id. at 214, 493 P.2d at 375.
370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.




exist. 3 Virginia states that such representation may not be al-
lowed because it will in fact compromise well-established ethical
principles, although the committee offers no facts from which an
inference of compromise of principles could be drawn, but bases
its conclusions upon ideas held by "the public" about the nature
of the marital relationship." In effect both decisions disqualify
married lawyers from certain representation on the basis of "un-
founded charges of impropriety."65
B. Lawyer-spouse's Firm Against Lawyer-spouse's Firm
It has been stated under the original Canons, under the present
Code, and by numerous opinions of this Committee that what a
lawyer cannot do because of ethical precepts neither his partner,
associate, employee or co-shareholder may do."6
This principle of vicarious disqualification has also been ap-
plied by courts, particularly in actions where, for example, the
plaintiff seeks to disqualify the defendant's lawyer because of a
former association of that lawyer and the plaintiff's lawyer. 7 It
has been embodied as a disciplinary rule in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility by an amendment adopted by the American
Bar Association. Previously, disqualification of lawyers in an en-
tire firm was required (as a minimum standard) only when one
member of the firm could not accept employment because it con-
flicted with the interests of another client.68 Under the amended
rule, however:
If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or
63 See note 50 supra.
1, Virginia opinion at 2.
11 Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
u COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 56, citing COLORADO BAR Ass'N ETHICS COMM., FORMAL
OPINION No. 27 (1963), and ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 33 (1931).
67 See, e.g., Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975; Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F.
Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1002 (1959). In Laskey Bros. the court states: "[A]Il authorities agree that all members
of a partnership are barred from participating in a case from which one partner is disquali-
fied." 224 F.2d at 826.
'5 If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
ABA CODE DR 5-105(D) (1971).
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any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or
continue such employment."
Both the Colorado and Virginia opinions have concluded that
representation of clients with conflicting interests by husband
and wife is not ethically proper, and that consent of the clients
involved is not available to lawyers under such circumstances.
Because they cannot obtain consent of their clients, the lawyers
are required to decline the employment according to Disciplinary
Rule 5-101(A)." Under the strict standard of vicarious disqualifi-
cation described in the preceding paragraphs, one would assume
that the lawyers' firms must also be unable to accept the employ-
ment.
Both opinions apply this strict standard to the situation in
which one lawyer-spouse actively participates in a case against
the other spouse's firm.7 But both decline to rule that the two
firms must refuse representation against each other so long as
neither spouse participates in the matter, holding that such rep-
resentation does not present such an appearance of impropriety
as to require disqualification. This reasoning fails to recognize
that it is not an appearance of impropriety which requires firm
disqualification, but the fact that one lawyer in the firm is pre-
cluded from accepting the representation because of ethical pre-
cepts."
The anomaly created by the opinions is readily apparent. If
the proper interpretation of the Code requires the conclusion that
spouses cannot directly represent opposing interests, then a con-
sistent interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) requires that
" Id., as amended, March 1, 1974.
7 Id. DR 5-101(A).
"' COLOanDO OPINION No. 52 at 56-57; Virginia opinion at 2.
12 The simple fact that spouses practice with firms representing clients
with conflicting interests shoud not automatically invoke the disqualifica-
tion of DR 5-105(D) . . . . [Tihe potential for an appearance of impropriety
as proscribed by Ethical Consideration 9-2 is not great enough to ethically
preclude representation.
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 57.
Conclusion 3 [that the firms may represent opposing interests when
neither spouse participates] was reached in recognition that in such cases
the Committee cannot arbitrarily conclude . . . that an appearance of im-
propriety must necessarily result.
Virginia opinion at 2.
13 See text accompanying notes 66 and 69 supra.
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both firms which employ the spouses must decline that represen-
tation. The committees' reluctance to adopt this latter rule casts
doubt upon the correctness of the former conclusion.
Obviously, applying a broad requirement of vicarious dis-
qualification, as the Code seems to require, would produce very
harsh results. The committees were correct in holding that such
representation does not create serious appearances of impro-
priety. However, to reach this conclusion they had to misinterpret
or ignore Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D). Recognizing the necessity
for exercising great care in the prohibition of any kind of represen-
tation would avoid such inconsistency and obtain a result reason-
able under both the Code and accepted principles of legal ethics.
Such prohibitions should not be made on the basis of unsubstan-
tiated claims of "appearances of impropriety."
C. Representation Involving Public Office
Opinion 52 concludes that it is improper for a lawyer to de-
fend a person in a criminal case prosecuted by a member of the
district attorney's office which employs the lawyer's spouse.74 Al-
though not specifically stated, presumably the committee would
not permit representation directly against the lawyer's spouse,
but would permit it by a member of one spouse's firm against a
member of the other spouse's office.
Similar conclusions are drawn by the Arizona Ethics Com-
mittee.7 5 That committee applies its opinion to any situation in
which one spouse is a member of the staff of a public office en-
gaged in criminal prosecution, and the other is a member of a firm
engaged in private practice in the same community.7" The com-
mittee holds that representation would be improper if either
spouse is directly involved in the prosecution or defense.77 It then
sets forth strict guidelines for maintaining complete separation of
the case from either spouse, and determines that, if those guide-
lines are complied with, other members of the private firm can
defend in a case prosecuted by other members of the prosecuting
office.78
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55, 56.
7' ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6.
7' Id. at 1.
I d. at 12, 13.
78 Id. at 14.
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The Illinois opinion"m was in answer to the question posed by
a lawyer whose wife was an assistant state's attorney as to
whether he could represent defendants prosecuted by his wife or
another assistant in that office. The primary responsibility of the
state's attorney was in domestic matters, but she did prosecute
many misdemeanors and "an occasional" felony case."0 The eth-
ics committee said:
We speak of husband and wife being united as one. How two people
can live together as husband and wife while they are in the midst of
contending with all the strength, energy and ability at their com-
mand as opponents in a lawsuit and particularly in a criminal case,
is difficult to understand."
The committee then found such representation improper, due to
the fact that defendants might seek out the spouse in private
practice, who might receive special consideration in the defense
of the case."2 On this basis, the committee held not only that the
husband cannot represent defendants in criminal cases prose-
cuted by the state's attorney's office, but also that he cannot
represent plaintiffs in civil cases involving a criminal violation,
whether or not there is or has been a prosecution. 3 The opinion
does not consider whether a lawyer associated with the husband
could defend a person prosecuted by another member of the
state's attorney's office, nor does it indicate how it might decide
this question.
All three opinions find that the potential conflict presented
when lawyer-spouses take opposite sides of a criminal case is not
one which can be avoided by full disclosure and consent. 4 Ari-
zona relies on the grounds that the state cannot consent to such
representation, and that, even if it could, to do so would be to
sanction an appearance of impropriety. 5 The Colorado commit-
tee says that consent is not available to sanction representation
of conflicting interests in cases which involve the public interest.88
The Illinois opinion finds consent unavailable because of the na-
ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311.
I d. at 1.
I d.
92 Id.
u Id. at 3.
" ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 5; COLOADO OPINION No. 52 at 56; Iu.LNOIS OPINION
No. 311 at 2.
ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 5.
" COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 56, citing DRINKER, supra note 37, at 120.
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ture of the conflict itself. That committee states that consent is
designed to permit employment of a lawyer in a situation where
the conflict of interests arises from separate, unrelated transac-
tions, not from the very transaction in which employment is
sought. s7 All these statements about consent apply a principle
developed in the context of consent to representation of opposing
clients by one lawyer to a different situation-conflict between
the lawyer's personal and professional interests."'
A holding that, solely because of the marriage relationship,
consent is unavailable to allow a lawyer to defend a client repre-
sented by the prosecuting office which employs the lawyer's
spouse requires a conclusion that the private spouse's entire firm
must be precluded from defense work against the public spouse's
office. This situation was considered by the Philadelphia Bar
Association Ethics Committee in 1961.1' That committee con-
cluded that the marriage relationship itself did not ethically pre-
clude one spouse or the spouse's partners and associates from
engaging in criminal practice, but that any situation which would
impair the community's confidence in the administration of jus-
tice had to be avoided. 0 Such loss of confidence would be most
likely, according to the committee, if the two spouses were di-
rectly involved in the matter, and might occur even if neither
spouse were involved.9 Ways to decrease the likelihood of such a
loss of confidence include insulating both spouses from the case,
and obtaining the defendant's informed consent to the represen-
tation.92 This approach avoids a flat prohibition based on the
marital status of the lawyers, and there is thus no requirement
under the principle of vicarious disqualification that the private
firm is barred from criminal defense work.
" ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311 at 2, citing ILLNoIs STATE BAR ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL ETHics
OPINION No. 166 (1958). This opinion considered the question of whether full disclosure
and consent would permit two lawyers in the same firm to represent opposite sides in the
same matter, and concluded that it would not.
" See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
" PHILADELPHIA BAR Ass'N Emics COMM., OPINION No. 61-3 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as PHILADELPHIA OPINION No. 61-3], cited in ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 6. The Philadel-
phia committee considered whether a lawyer or his partners or associates are barred from
representing criminal defendants when the lawyer's spouse is an assistant district attor-
ney. A digest of its opinion appears in MARu, supra note 23, 4031.
" PHILADELPHIA OPINION No. 61-3, cited in ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 13.
91 Id.
11 ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 14.
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One may also limit the facts which reasonably support an
inference that the criminal justice system has been impaired by
a careful definition of the public spouse's official function. For
instance, the Arizona committee states that, when its opinion
refers to a member of a public prosecutor's staff which employs
one spouse "we have reference solely to a lawyer actively engaged
in the prosecution of criminal cases, and not to a lawyer whose
duties pertain solely to matters other than criminal prosecutions
(e.g., a lawyer working solely on civil matters)."93
This approach is consistent with the attitude shown by the
Colorado Supreme Court in a case involving charges of unethical
conduct by lawyers who were or had been public employees. In
Medberry v. People"4 a defendant appealed his conviction of mur-
der on the ground that his trial lawyer was a county attorney in
the county where the case was prosecuted and should have been
disqualified. In rejecting this contention, the Colorado Supreme
Court observed that the county attorney was employed to serve
as adviser to the county commissioners, and took no part in initi-
ating criminal proceedings. Therefore,
[Iln defending one charged with crime, at least where the county
has no interest beyond that ordinarily attaining, a county attorney
does not represent conflicting interests nor serve two masters. 5
If such careful consideration of a public official's function
allows one lawyer to represent potentially conflicting interests,
similar care should be taken in defining a lawyer's duties so as to
allow the lawyer's spouse to accept such representation.
In conclusion, the Virginia and Colorado opinions apply a
rule of consent which was developed with reference to representa-
tion of two clients with conflicting interests by one attorney in
order to forbid representation of two such clients by husband and
wife. Under DR 5-105(D), this prohibition requires that the
lawyer-spouses' firms should also be disqualified from such repre-
sentation. The opinions eschew such vicarious disqualification
because representation of opposing interests by firms which em-
ploy lawyer-spouses does not present a sufficient appearance of
impropriety. This conclusion, although correct, is inconsistent
with the logical system of ethics presented by the Code of Profes-
I d. at 1.
107 Colo. 15, 108 P.2d 243 (1940).
Id. at 19, 108 P.2d at 245.
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sional Responsibility. The same result could be achieved in ac-
cord with the Code if the opinions permitted representation of
conflicting interests by husband and wife or their firms after full
disclosure to and consent by the clients.
Similarly, completely forbidding defense by one spouse of
criminal cases prosecuted by the other solely because of their
marital relationship should require that the private attorney's
firm is precluded from defense work against the other spouse's
office. Vicarious disqualification of married lawyers' firms can be
avoided, however, by opinions which focus, not on the lawyers'
status, but instead on public confidence in the criminal justice
system and which prohibit facts which might decrease that con-
fidence, as did the Philadelphia Bar Association's Opinion Num-
ber 61-3.11 Such opinions could require insulation of lawyers with
potentially conflicting personal interests from participation on
either side of criminal cases, taking care to define the function of
a lawyer in public office precisely so that such insulation is as
narrow as possible.
II. THE CONSTITUTION
The opinions under consideration are subject to criticism not
only because of their strained interpretations of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, but also because there exist serious ques-
tions as to their constitutionality. Before those questions can be
analyzed, however, one must determine whether the issuance of
the opinions by the various ethics committees constitutes state
action sufficient to activate the protections of the fourteenth
amendment.
A. State Action
Governmental action sufficient to be subject to constitu-
tional restrictions is most clearly found in the issuance of the
Arizona and Virginia opinions. In each of those states, the bar
association is an official arm of the state supreme court, created
for the purpose of assisting in the regulation of the legal profes-
sion, and all lawyers admitted to practice must belong to the bar
association. 7 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar" the Court recog-
96 See notes 89-91 supra, and accompanying text.
g ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-201 (1956) (creation of the Association); ARIz. Sup. CT.
R. 27(a) (membership requirements); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
gx 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
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nized that the Virginia Bar was a state agency when acting within
its statutory mandate, although holding that the ultra vires en-
forcement of a minimum fee schedule was not state action99 for
Sherman Act purposes.'" Accordingly, the integrated bars' ethics
opinions, unless untra vires, would constitute state action.
The Illinois State Bar Association is a private organization,
and issuance of its opinion might initially seem to be private
action. However, the inquiry and hearing divisions of the associa-
tion's disciplinary committee are commissioned by the Illinois
Supreme Court to serve on the court's disciplinary commission.",'
As commissioners, they are charged with investigating and hear-
ing complaints against lawyers, and with recommending the dis-
ciplinary action to be taken by the supreme court in each case.'12
Given this official function of a part of the bar asociation in the
discipline of attorneys, the opinions of its ethics committee on the
same subject would arguably also constitute state action because
of the committee's involvement with a state agency'03 in perform-
ing the public function of regulating the legal profession.'0
The Colorado Bar Association is also a private organization,
and it has no official function in the discipline of Colorado attor-
neys."'5 However, a variety of supposedly private activities have
been found subject to constitutional restrictions."' No precise test
for recognizing state action has been formulated, since "[o]nly
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance. "107
One approach to the question of state action has been to
" Id. at 2015.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 753(a) (Supp. 1974).
" Id. 753(a)-(c).
3 Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
and McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
I For cases recognizing that public functions might be sufficient to constitute state
action, see Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
" Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 365, 325 P.2d 932, 936 (1958).
' See Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and cases
cited therein.
"I Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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determine whether the state is so involved with the private activ-
ity as to make it subject to constitutional limitations.'10 The
most recent cases applying the "state involvement" test have
concentrated especially on whether the involvement amounts to
governmental control of, or right to control, the nominally private
action. 109 "Under this control standard state ex officio
membership on policy-making bodies and state veto power over
institutional decisions might be important factors." 110 In the con-
text of this test, it is worth noting that the Board of Governors of
the Colorado Bar Association is made up of lawyers representing
different geographic regions of the state and representatives of
such state organizations as the District Attorneys Association,
the House of Representatives and State Senate, the County and
District Judges Associations, the Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court."' Also, on at least one occasion, the Colorado
Supreme Court has reacted to an opinion of the bar association's
ethics committee by stating that lawyers affected should ignore
the opinion."2 This is action tantamount to veto power over the
committee's decisions, and therefore within the control test set
forth in Pendrell v. Chatham College."1
3
The second approach courts have used in finding that nomi-
nally private action constitutes state action has been the "public
function" test."4 "[Sitate action exists where a private entity
performs what would ordinarily be a municipal, governmental
function .. ."I" One recent case applying this doctrine is
United States v. Wiseman,"6 which held that private process
servers performed a public function." 7 In Dacey v. New York
O* Cases cited note 103 supra.
' McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Pendrell v. Chatham
College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
Colorado Bar Association 1974-1975 Administration, 4 CoLo. LAwYER 47, 48 (1975).
"2 Address by Charles R. Frederickson, supra note 45.
" 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See text accompanying note 110 supra.
114 Cases cited note 104 supra.
IS Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 497 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See Barrett
v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), citing Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974).
445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971).
Id. at 796, citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
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County Lawyers' Association"' the author of the book How to
Avoid Probate! sued the New York County Lawyers' Association
for denial of his civil rights.."9 Dacey charged that the Associa-
tion's petition to adjudge him in contempt for unlawful practice
of law was an attempted abridgement of his rights to freedom of
speech and press.'20 The Second Circuit applied the doctrine of
judicial immunity to the suit by Dacey, noting that "when the
Association instituted its proceedings against Dacey, its role was
analogous to that of a public prosecutor.''2
Many cases have found that the practice of law is a public
function. 22 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that restraint
of illegal practice of law benefits both the legal profession, by
protecting lawyers' private interests in having business, and the
general public, by protecting lay people from the harm of having
unqualified people act as lawyers. 2 3 In the context of disbarment
proceedings, the same court has stated, "It is the privilege, if not
the duty, of every attorney to call to the attention of this court
any act of a licensed attorney which may fairly be considered to
disqualify him."'
'2 4
In addition to formal regulation of the legal profession by the
courts, most state bar associations issue opinions like those under
consideration interpreting the ethical rules for their members.
12 5
Although such opinions may not have final authority,
[they] do have a considerable informal force. There are no scientific
studies to prove this, but bar executives and officers, Ethics Com-
mittee members, and others with experience have repeatedly stated
that this is so.'1
2
"' 423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
III The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
' The Association's petition was eventually dismissed. New York County Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967).
423 F.2d at 192.
' See, e.g., In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 327-28, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (1935); In re Thomas,
16 Colo. 441, 446, 27 P. 707, 708 (1891); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Johnson, 344
Ill. 132, 143, 176 N.E. 278, 282 (1931).
"2 Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 409, 312 P.2d
998, 1003-04 (1957).
"I People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Class, 70 Colo. 381, 384, 201 P. 883, 884 (1921)
(dictum).
' M.Au, supra note 23, at 1.
I' Id. at 2-3. Following this statement, Maru cites several authorities, including D.
Sears, then Chairman of the Ethics Comm., Colo. Bar Ass'n, in 33 TENN. L. REv. 145
(1966).
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In Colorado the present rules of procedure for the discipline of
attorneys'27 were drafted by the grievance committee of the Colo-
rado Bar Association and submitted by its Board of Governors to
the Colorado Supreme Court, which adopted rules "substantially
the same" as those submitted to it.
2 8
In summary, state officials with the power to discipline attor-
neys have been involved to a considerable extent with the Colo-
rado Bar Association, as evidenced by their representation on the
organization's Board of Governors and by the fact that, on at least
one occasion, the supreme court has, in effect, vetoed an opinion
issued by the association's ethics committee.2 9 Moreover, given
the attitude that regulation of the practice of law is a public
function, 30 participation in that function by the bar association
in such ways as drafting rules of procedure for the discipline of
attorneys and issuing opinions on questions of professional ethics
adds support to a finding that the issuance of Colorado's Opinion
52 constitutes state action.
3'
If the opinions under consideration are deemed to constitute
state action, they are subject to the restrictions imposed on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The effect of the opinions
may be considered under four aspects of constitutional rights:
The burden on a lawyer's choice to marry another lawyer; 32 the
restriction of the lawyer-spouses in the exercise of their rights to
work in the occupations they choose; 33 the interference with
clients' rights to counsel of their choice; 34 and the use of an irre-
buttable presumption that lawyers married to one another cannot
zealously and professionally represent clients with differing inter-
ests.'
31
B. Right to Marry
The effect of an ethics opinion which absolutely precludes
COLO. R. Cnv. P. Ch. 20.
" Molen, Foreword to COLORADO BAR ASS'N, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSI-
BLTIES OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES IN COLORADO at 4 (1957).
'2' Notes 110, 112 supra, and text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
"I Of course, if the opinion is used by the Colorado Supreme Court to discipline an
attorney, state action would clearly be found, under the reasoning of Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
132 See text accompanying notes 17-19, 23 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
,' See text following note 19 supra.
3 See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
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representation of differing interests by lawyers married to each
other is to penalize a lawyer's choice to marry another lawyer. A
lawyer may find, for example, that he is unable to represent de-
fendants in criminal cases because his wife is an assistant district
attorney. Or both spouses may find themselves unable to obtain
jobs, because prospective employers wish to avoid possible con-
flicts with other law firms in the community. 3 ' This harsh effect
on lawyers related to each other by marriage is in striking con-
tract to the relative leniency with which representation of differ-
ing interests by lawyers related in other ways is treated. 7
The marriage relationship has long been conceded to occupy
a protected position under the Constitution:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights
to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically pro-
tected. '
A variety of state regulatory schemes have been found unconsti-
tutional because of their effects on the marriage relationship: A
state tax law under which income of the wife and children living
with the husband was taxed as the husband's; 39 mandatory ma-
ternity leave rules for school teachers; 40 and laws forbidding use
of contraceptives by married people.'
In addition to those schemes, anti-miscegenation statutes
have been held invalid because they interfere with the freedom
to marry.' In Perez v. Lippold 3 the California Supreme Court
held that marriage is "a fundamental right of free men" which
could not be infringed by the state except for important objec-
tives and by reasonable means.'44 Furthermore, the court said:
'3' See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
'37 See note 23 supra.
' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 715, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (1948).
'3' Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
40 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
"' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d
17 (1948).
", 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
'" Id. at 714, 198 P.2d at 18-19.
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Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from
marrying a member of a race other than his own restricts the scope
of his choice and therefore restricts his right to marry.'
Under this reasoning, the harsh effects which result from the
opinions under discussion amount to a penalty on a lawyer's
choice to marry another lawyer, and therefore restrict his or her
right to marry. Certainly, the states' objective, protection of the
public by prevention of conflicts of interests between lawyer-
spouses, is important. Whether absolute preclusion of such repre-
sentation by lawyers married to one another is a reasonable
means to that objective is open to serious question.'
C. Right to Work
As already discussed, one effect of the opinions under consid-
eration may be to close employment opportunities for lawyers, at
least in certain fields within the profession.147 To determine
whether such an effect renders the opinions unconstitutional, it
is necessary to examine the somewhat complicated line of cases
in the area of the right to work.
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.'
However, the right to work is not an absolute one, and this is
particularly true of what the Colorado Supreme Court has called
"the learned professions," for which the state may require a li-
cense of one who wishes to practice. 4 Although the states may
regulate admission to, or practice of, such professions in order to
protect the public, they cannot do so "in a manner or for reasons
that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 50 At least one court has warned
"' Id. at 715, 198 P.2d at 19.
' See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), quoted in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720
(1973). A similar view of the right to work as a fundamental right is found in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490, 491 (5th Cir.
1953); Battaglia v. Moore, 128 Colo. 327, 332, 261 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1953); People v. Love,
298 11. 304, 310-11, 131 N.E. 809, 811 (1921).
People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 P. 928 (1929).
"s Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Cf. In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Ex parte Garland, 71
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that standards of professional ethics must not be interpreted in
such a way as "to unnecessarily circumscribe the career of a
young professional. The Canons may not be used . . to obtain
the advantages of an implied restrictive covenant that would be
of doubtful validity in any other employment situation."''
Although one may have a right to work as a lawyer which
may not be infringed by the state, it is not as clear that one has
a right to work as, for example, a criminal lawyer. A strong argu-
ment demonstrating the existence of such a right may be found
in the case of Prouty v. Heron."2 There, the plaintiff had been
licensed as a professional engineer, without restriction. There-
after, he sought renewal of his license, and was classified as a civil
engineer. He sued to enjoin the Colorado Board of Examiners for
Engineers and Land Surveyors from restricting his practice to
that branch of the profession, and the injunction was granted.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that he acquired a valuable
right protected by the due process clause of the Colorado and
United States Constitutions when he qualified for a license to
practice without restriction under the standards prevailing at the
time of his admission. "It follows, therefore, that the legislature
cannot . . deny or abridge that right in any manner except for
cause," and then only in accordance with due process require-
ments.' The limitation on an engineer's right to practice all
specialties within his profession is analogous to the restrictions
which the opinions studied in this article impose on the practice
of law by lawyers married to other lawyers. As with the opinions'
effect on the right to marry, it is necessary to inquire whether the
limitation on a lawyer's right to practice his profession is neces-
sary to achieve an important state objective. While the import-
ance of the state's objective is conceded, whether the means cho-
sen is reasonable is doubtful. 5 4
D. Clients' Rights to Counsel of Their Choice
As discussed above, 5 there are many situations in which
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Chenoweth v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141
P. 132 (1913).
5I Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
12 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
" Id. at 174-75, 255 P.2d at 758.
'" See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
" See text following note 19 supra.
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clients may undergo substantial hardship because of the opinions
under consideration. This is particularly true in instances where
one spouse is employed in a matter against the other spouse's
firm, as, for instance, where the husband seeks to represent the
buyer of a house who obtains a mortgage loan from a bank repre-
sented by the wife's law firm. The flat prohibition against repre-
sentation of differing interests by lawyers married to each other
may also work hardship in highly-specialized areas of law where
relatively few lawyers with the required training and experience
may be available. In such a field, the question of conflicts of
interests may be complicated by the fact that attorneys may
move from one firm to another as they gain experience in the
field; it is thus instructive to review the doctrines which have
developed regarding conflicts with the interests of clients of one's
former firms.
In general, a former client need show only that the attorney
representing his present adversary represented him in a matter
substantially related to the present case, and such a showing will
establish an irrebuttable inference that the attorney received con-
fidential information of value to the adversary. 15 This inference
becomes rebuttable, however, where the attorney is to be "vicari-
ously disqualified"-for example, by virtue of his partner's for-
mer association with a firm which represents the client.'57 One
reason given for allowing a lawyer to rebut the presumption is
that the "effect of an over-harsh rule of disqualification must be
to hinder adequate protection of clients' interests in view of the
difficulty in discovering technically trained attorneys in special-
ized areas who were not disqualified ... "8
It is important to note that this recognition of the need to
protect clients' interests in obtaining qualified counsel has arisen
in the context of representation by an attorney which conflicts
with the interests of another of his clients,'59 present or past.
Certainly similar protection of that right should be offered for
t' Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed,
264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
... Id.; Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
587 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
"I Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955). See
also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583, 587
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
"I ABA CODE DR 5-105.
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clients where the representation conflicts with the lawyer's per-
sonal, financial, or property interests, 60 provided that the client
gives informed consent to such representation. Protection of this
right should not require a showing of special hardship such as lack
of other qualified counsel to allow the client's knowledgeable
choice of his lawyer to be honored.
E. Conclusive Presumptions
To the extent that the opinions absolutely forbid representa-
tion by a lawyer of interests which differ from those represented
by his spouse solely because of the marital relationship they act
as conclusive presumptions that the lawyers are not capable of
professionally representing their clients.' The~use of such a
presumption of unfitness raises serious questions as to the opin-
ions' constitutionality.
The classic discussion of the role of presumptions in statu-
tory schemes is given by the Supreme Court in the case Mobile,
J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed.'62 The Court there holds that it is
permissible for a given regulatory scheme to allow or require an
inference of one fact from evidence of another, without denial of
due process of law, but only if
there [is] some rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and [if] the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely
arbitrary matter....
If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing
a rule of evidence .. .does not shut out from the party affected a
reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the
facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due
process of law has been denied him.
6 3
Thus, there are two approaches to challenging a presumption
in a regulatory scheme. First, one may show that there is no
rational relationship between the fact proved and the fact pre-
sumed. An example of this approach appears in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Murry.' 4 Murry involved a chal-
lenge to a rule which denied eligibility for food stamps to any
person over 18 who was claimed in the previous year as a depen-
16 Id. DR 5-101.
" See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
,' 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
Id. at 43.
" 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
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dent child for tax purposes by a taxpayer not in a household
eligible for food stamps, and to all members of the dependent's
household. The Court recognized Congress' interest in preventing
abuses of the food stamp program by children of wealthy parents,
particularly college students. However, it rejected the rule be-
cause the standard it set had no rational relation to the depen-
dent child's present indigency or need for food stamps, and even
less rationality as a measure of the need of other members of his
household.'65 "It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process
''156
The second approach is to show that the presumption pre-
vents a defense to the fact presumed by the one on whom it
operates. This argument was advanced early in this century to
overturn tax regulations which presumed conclusively that gifts
made within a certain time before a taxpayer's death were in
contemplation thereof and so were taxable as part of the donor's
estate."7 In rejecting such statutes, the Court said, "a statute
which imposes a tax upon an assumption of fact which the tax-
payer is forbidden to controvert, is so arbitrary and unreasonable
that it cannot stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
' 68
In recent years, the doctrine that conclusive presumptions
violate due process by preventing a defense to the fact presumed
has been applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate a number
of legislative or regulatory schemes. Carrington v. Rash"9 in-
volved a provision of the Texas constitution which denied the
right to vote in state elections to a member of the Armed Forces
not registered to vote in Texas prior to induction. Forbidding a
soldier any opportunity to controvert the presumption of nonres-
idence "imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'' ° Similarly, suspension of a driver's
license of a driver involved in an accident who failed to give proof
of financial responsibility was found unconstitutional because the
I5 d. at 513.
'" Id. at 514.
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (federal statute applied to gifts within two
years of death); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (state law applied to gifts
within six years of death).
"I Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932). Note that present federal tax law
contains a rebuttable presumption that gifts made within three years of death should be
taxed as part of the decedent's estate. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035(b).
"' 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Id. at 96.
VOL. 52
SPOUSES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
statutory scheme did not consider whether the driver was in fact
liable;' a regulation which allowed children to be taken away
from their unwed father without a hearing on his fitness was
struck down;'72 and a state regulation under which the classifica-
tion of residency or non-residency for tuition purposes was un-
changeable while the student remained enrolled in the state uni-
versity was found void.'73
Most recently, the Supreme Court heard a case involving
rules which required pregnant school teachers to take unpaid
leaves of absence upon reaching a designated month of preg-
nancy.'74 The school systems sought to justify their rules on the
ground that they were protecting their interest in preventing unfit
teachers from teaching. This interest was found legitimate, but
the Court held that the challenged regulations swept too broadly,
amounting to a conclusive presumption that all pregnant women
are unfit to teach after a particular point of pregnancy. Under this
reasoning, the regulations were found unconstitutional, because
"permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." '
The Colorado and Virginia ethics opinions are subject to
challenge in both respects. By prohibiting representation of op-
posing interests by husband and wife, they prevent the lawyers
from showing that there is in fact no conflict of interest, or that
the clients have given informed consent to the representation.
Furthermore, neither opinion suggests a basis in fact which would
support an inference of professional misconduct from the fact
that the lawyers are married to one another. Instead, both rely
on "the public's" view of the marital relationship, without any
attempt to demonstrate that "the public," or even a significant
minority of it, holds such a view. Because the opinions lack ra-
" Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 645 (1971).
'T' Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
'7 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
'' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In this case two lower court
decisions were consolidated. One challenged a regulation which required a teacher to begin
maternity leave after four months of pregnancy. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326
F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972). The other involved
a rule requiring leave to begin after five months. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd.,
326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
"I Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644, citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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tional relationship between the fact proved and the fact inferred,
and because they prevent any defense to the fact presumed, they
are subject to challenge as invalid conclusive presumptions.
IlI. REGULATING CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
In determining whether it is necessary to forbid representa-
tion of conflicting interests by lawyers married to each other, one
should consider whether there is an adequate system available to
provide satisfactory discipline in any cases where the lawyers do
in fact act improperly. This approach has been used by the U. S.
Supreme Court in cases in which lawyers were denied admission
to the bar. The Court has required a showing that exclusion of the
individual or class of individuals is essential to accomplish the
state's interest in maintaining high professional standards. 7 ' The
same showing should be made before flatly denying a lawyer the
right to accept a certain kind of representation, but the opinions
under examination have failed to do so.
In Colorado the machinery for disciplining attorneys has re-
cently been strengthened by a requirement that attorneys admit-
ted to the bar and actively practicing in the state must pay an
annual fee to defray the cost of disciplinary procedures against
lawyers."' The system has been used frequently to discipline at-
torneys for a variety of unprofessional conduct.7 8 Even if discipli-
nary proceedings are not brought, representation which presents
a serious conflict of interest may be challenged by a party to a
case through a motion to disqualify the attorney involved. 79
In view of the unsatisfactory results which arise from the
prohibition of representation by spouses of clients with differing
interests, and the fact that suitable means to discipline lawyers
who act unprofessionally in such a situation are available, the
opinions' conclusions that consent may not be given to represen-
"' In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 727 (1973) (denial of admission to a resident alien).
See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
'7 COLO. R. Civ. P. 227.
People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971); People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo.
357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971); People v. (Attorneys Respondent), 162 Colo. 174, 427 P.2d 330
(1967); People v. Selby, 156 Colo. 17, 396 P.2d 598 (1964); People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n
v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 115, 285 P. 758 (1930). Cf. Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver
Dist. Ct., 177 Colo. 210, 493 P.2d 374 (1972), and text accompanying notes 58-59, supra.
"I, See, e.g., Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc.,
163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1002 (1959); Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver Dist. Ct., 177 Colo. 210,
493 P.2d 374 (1972).
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tation which pits lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse or the
spouse's firm is unnecessary. A better approach to the question
of such representation could be made if the ethics committees
had begun their inquiries with the following assumption:
There is no reason to doubt that these are mature, capable individu-
als who will honor the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any...
policy that, in effect, denies equal opportunity to either spouse on a
contrary assumption should accordingly be discouraged, for it resists
the new reality from which clients and the profession itself benefit
that accords married men and women equal treatment. 80
CONCLUSION
The author realizes that, at the present time, most clients'
consent would probably result in restrictions similar to those set
forth in the opinions under discussion. That is, most clients would
consent to representation by the firms so long as neither spouse
is involved; some clients would consent to representation by a
lawyer against a client represented by the lawyer's spouse's firm;
and only a few clients would knowingly consent to direct repre-
sentation of conflicting interests by husband and wife.
The reader might inquire why the decision of clients is prefer-
able to the holdings of the opinions if in fact it is likely that the
effect of the two will be similar. One answer is that there is great
value gained by achieving a result acceptable to lawyers and
nonlawyers without sacrificing consistent application of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, the number of law-
yers married to other lawyers will continue to increase with the
increased enrollment of women in law school, and that increase
will no doubt be accompanied by greater acceptance of husband
and wife lawyers as professionally responsible, competent indi-
viduals. Allowing clients who wish it the right to consent to repre-
sentation of differing interests by husband and wife will allow
smooth adjustment to that increased acceptance.
Nancy B. Calvin
Simpson Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3.
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APPENDIX A
COLORADO OPINION No. 52
(Adopted February 9, 1974)
Syllabus
It is improper for a lawyer to represent a client having interests which differ from
those of a client represented by the lawyer's spouse, and such impropriety may, but does
not necessarily extend to members and associates of the firms with which each spouse is
associated.
Facts
Lawyer A and Lawyer B are husband and wife. They are not associated in the practice
of law.
1. Lawyer A seeks to represent a client whose interests differ from those of a client
represented by Lawyer B.
2. Lawyer A seeks to represent a client being prosecuted by a district attorney's
office which employs Lawyer B.
3. Lawyer C, a member of Lawyer A's firm, seeks to represent a client having
interests which differ from those of a client represented by Lawyer D, a member of Lawyer
B's firm.
Opinion
These fact situations raise the question of whether there is any conflict of interest
when husband and wife represent clients having differing interests. Closely aligned are
subsidiary questions of whether, if such conflict exists, it can be eliminated by full disclo-
sure and consent by the clients or whether there is such an appearance of impropriety that
the employment must be declined. Finally, these fact situations raise the question of
whether the ethical obligation to decline employment must extend to members of a firm
with which either spouse practices.
Our opinion recognizes the realities of the marital relationship and the possibility at
least that the domestic and professional responsibilities of lawyers A and B may be on a
collision course when they represent conflicting interests.
It takes little imagination to anticipate innumerable situations where either spouse
might find it difficult to exercise professional judgment solely for the benefit of the client
and free of personal considerations. This is not to impute improper intentions to any
lawyer, nor to ignore the fact that in many marriage situations no actual conflict of
interest would exist. It simply recognizes that this situation is generally fraught with great
potential for conflict of interests. See particularly EC 5-21. Thus, to the extent that their
clients' conflict may lead lawyers A and B into either domestic or financial conflict, one
disciplinary rule immediately comes into play. DR 5-101(A) states:
"Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, busi-
ness, property or personal interests."
For purposes of this opinion, we assume full consent from the clients. We note,
however, that:
"The Canon does not sanction representation of conflicting interests where
such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such cases. The Ameri-
can Bar Association has acquiesced in numerous decisions of its Ethics Com-
mittee construing the exception as not exclusive and consent is unavailable
where the public interest is involved. There are, also, certain cases in which
such representation is improper or at least unwise even with consent."
Drinker, Legal Ethics, p. 120 (1953).
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The question, therefore, is whether this conflict of interest, real or potential, may still
allow for representation after consent is given. Obviously, without consent the proffered
representation must be declined. The primary ethical consideration is whether such repre-
sentation raises the appearance of impropriety. Ethical Consideration 9-2 reads:
"Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may
appear to a layman to be unethical. . . . When, explicit ethical guidance
does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal
system and the legal profession."
We are of the opinion that Fact Situation 1 gives rise to such an appearance of
impropriety, even though such impropriety may not in fact exist, that such representation
should be scrupulously avoided.
The same considerations are applicable where either spouse is in public office. Formal
Opinions 14, 18, 45, 46 and 48. The additional ethical consideration which is applicable
to Fact Situation 2 is EC 8-8, which states:
". ... A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should
not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or
foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties."
See also ABA Opinions 34 and 186 and New York State Bar Opinion 149. Thus, we
conclude that because of the public visibility of Lawyers A and B the relationship de-
scribed in Fact Situation 2 is improper.
Fact Situation 3 involves the concept generally referred to as "vicarious disqualifica-
tion." This concept is incorporated into DR 5-105(D), which states:
"If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employ-
ment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept
or continue such employment."
This disciplinary rule and its associated ethical concepts support strongly the state-
ments in the Preamble to the Code of Professional Responsibility that while ethical con-
siderations are primarily "aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive," lawyers must nonetheless "with
courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of law to the ever-changing
relationships of society." Traditionally the opinions of this Committee and those of other
state bar associations and the American Bar Association have construed the concept of
"vicarious disqualification" broadly. It has been stated under the original Canons, under
the present Code, and by numerous opinions of this Committee that what a lawyer cannot
do because of ethical precepts neither his partner, associate, employee or co-shareholder
may do. Formal Opinion 27 and ABA Opinion 33. We do not wish to change or affect this
body of well-reasoned opinion. In our view, the same rationale which requires a lawyer to
decline employment in Fact Situations 1 and 2 applies to either Lawyer C or D when the
client is directly and personally represented by one spouse or the other. In other words, if
Lawyer A's personal client has an interest which differs from that of a client of the firm
in which Lawyer A's spouse practices, there would be a requirement to decline the employ-
ment. Even though the client's consent is obtained after full disclosure, this appearance
of impropriety cannot be avoided.
The same rationale is inapplicable, in our opinion, where firm clients-as opposed to
personal clients-have differing interests. The simple fact that spouses practice with firms
representing clients with conflicting interests should not automatically invoke the disqual-
ification of DR 5-105(D). Where the clients are fully informed of the situation and choose
to consent to continued representation, the potential for an appearance of impropriety as
proscribed by Ethical Consideration 9-2 is not great enough to ethically preclude represen-
tation.
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Of course, we assume that neither spouse actually obtains information about the
clients represented by the other spouse's firm as the result of the marital relationship. If
either Lawyer A or B receives information inadvertently or otherwise by reason of the
marital relationship, the confidences thus obtained must be preserved inviolate. See ABA
Opinion 47.
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APPENDIx B
Opinion letter from R.J. Lillard, Chairman, Legal Ethics Committee, The
Virginia State Bar, dated November 12, 1974.
This is in response to your letter of March 29, 1974, regarding the propriety of a lawyer
representing one party to a divorce action when the other party is being represented by a
firm of which the lawyer's spouse is a member.
Since receiving your inquiry the Legal Ethics Committee has received several other
inquiries and memoranda relating substantially to the same issue. In addition, we had
appear before us at our meeting in Richmond on May 22, 1974, two young ladies whose
presentations were most helpful. We have given all of this our most careful consideration.
The Committee is most reluctant to conclude that under no circumstances would it
be proper for an attorney to represent one party to an action when the attorney's spouse
represents the other party. Indeed, there could conceivably be circumstances where such
representation would not be improper per se; for example, in a completely uncontested
matter after full disclosure by both attorneys and acquiescence by the clients, or where
the husband and wife attorneys are in fact legally separated. Even these situations give
rise to problems but the Committee is not prepared to say that such representation is
improper per se. However, the Committee feels that these instances would be so isolated
that it should be enunciated as a general rule that representation under these circumstan-
ces is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Every client has the right to expect his lawyer's totally independent judgment and
undivided loyalty. (EC 5-1). Every lawyer should zealously guard against any personal
interest or involvement which might impair in any way his total, unrestrained dedication
to his client's cause. (EC 5-2). And every client must feel free to discuss whatever he
wishes with his lawyer. There should be no question of his lawyer's integrity in keeping
these confidences inviolate, and the client should feel no inhibition whatever in making
such revelations to his lawyer. (EC 4-1). To allow a husband and wife to advocate opposing
positions in the same controversy, in the opinion of our Committee, tends to compromise
these well-established principles of professional ethics.
We recognize the wide interest in the subject of your inquiry and that to limit our
response would leave related questions unanswered. Therefore, within the limits permit-
ted by the ethical considerations cited above, DR 5-105 (A through D), and Canon 9, it is
the consensus of our Committee that:
1. Lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse (i.e., each actively involved in the
same case) is not ethically permissible, absent circumstances such as set out
above.
2. Lawyer-spouse actively participating in a case against lawyer-spouse's
firm is not ethically permissible, (your inquiry), again absent similar circum-
stances.
3. Lawyer-spouse's firm against lawyer-spouse's firm (neither spouse ac-
tively participating) is permissible.
Conclusions 1 and 2 were reached in recognition that the public generally considers
the husband-wife relationship uniquely close, and that to hold otherwise would be to
approve the appearance of impropriety in derogation of Canon 9.
Conclusion 3 was reached in recognition that in such cases the Committee cannot
arbitrarily conclude either that an actual conflict of interest exists or that an appearance
of impropriety must necessarily result.

